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Abstract 
The politics of urban control has revolved around centralisation since independence in 
1980. However, such politics became more pronounced after 2000 owing to the rise of the 
opposition Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) as the main governing party in urban 
areas. Political tensions and contradictions ensued between central government, under the 
Zimbabwe African National Union (Patriotic Front) (ZANU[PF]), and local authorities, under 
the MDC, over the control and administration of urban areas. Based on 30 interviews, the 
article explains how central government and, by extension, ZANU(PF) attempted to regain 
control of urban areas through centralisation of water and vehicle licensing functions. 
This practice, however, contravenes existing laws. Hitherto, scholarship has attributed 
centralisation by the government to a strategy to defuse the opposition rule in cities. 
This article extends reasons for centralisation to include ZANU(PF)’s strong ideological 
belief in centralisation, access to resources in a failing economy and maintaining a firm 
grip on power. In particular, the article focuses on how urban politics is manifested in the 
transfer of water and sanitation and vehicle licensing functions from local authorities to 
government-run entities. It is also evident that the prioritisation of survival politics neglects 
key service delivery in urban centres. In the absence of a functionally devolved system of 
governance, this casts doubt on the feasibility and success of opposition political parties in 
governing African cities. 
 
Introduction 
In Africa, the nexus between politics and service delivery has become an important area of 
study, owing largely to the rise of opposition political parties in governing cities.1 Thus 
service delivery is often mired in and destabilised by deeply contested politics. In many 
African cities, urban political realities are contested and ‘service delivery is used as a source 
and resource for political agency’.2 This is most evident in countries such as Uganda, 
Senegal, South Africa, Zambia and Zimbabwe, in instances where opposition parties govern 
major cities. Parties controlling national governments have a tendency to subdue and weaken 
                                                          
1 D. Resnick, ‘Urban Governance and Service Delivery in African Cities: The Role of Politics and Policies’, Development Policy 
Review, 32, S1 (2014), pp. s3–s17; D. Muchadenyika, ‘Land for Housing: A Political Resource – Reflections from Zimbabwe’s Urban 
Areas’, Journal of Southern African Studies, 41, 6 (2015), pp. 1219–38; D. Resnick, ‘In the Shadow of the City: Africa’s Urban Poor in 
Opposition Strongholds’, Journal of Modern African Studies, 49, 1 (2011). pp. 141-66; D. Muchadenyika and J.J. Williams, ‘Social 
Change: Urban Governance and Urbanization in Zimbabwe’, Urban Forum, 27, 3 (2016), pp. 253–74. 
2 Muchadenyika, ‘Land for Housing’, p. 1220. 
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opposition-controlled cities, as the success of such cities can propel opposition parties to 
national governance. 
 
This article explores how urban politics is manifested through centralisation of functions by 
the national government in urban areas run predominantly by the opposition party. In 
particular, we explain the struggle to control urban centres in Zimbabwe between two 
political parties, the opposition MDC and the ruling ZANU(PF). In doing so, we examine 
two cases, namely the transfer of water and sanitation and vehicle licensing functions from 
local authorities to government-run entities. Such centralisation has, however, destroyed the 
institutional foundations of service delivery. 
 
It has been argued that ‘repressive forms of political interventions in city governance’ 
explain the dysfunctionality of water and sanitation services in Harare.3 In regions that have 
been critical of ZANU(PF) rule since 1980, such as Bulawayo, water has been used as a 
political tool to punish opposing views.4 The politicisation of urban water and sanitation 
brought the national government through the ‘back door’ to control everyday life in cities. 
However, it should be noted that, in Zimbabwe, the political struggle to control water has 
both colonial and post-colonial antecedents.5 In essence, it would seem that the post-colonial 
government resorted to political strategies of the colonial government to strip post-colonial 
cities of power and resources needed to flourish. Existing arguments on the centralisation of 
water, notably from Muchaparara Musemwa, focus on ethnic and regional tensions and 
political retribution, primarily in Bulawayo.6 
 
Here, we extend centralisation arguments to include access to resources by the national 
government in a debilitating economic environment, ZANU(PF)’s strong ideological belief 
in centralisation as a tool to organise the state and its desire to maintain a firm grip on 
power. We explore these arguments through focusing on two local government functions – 
namely water and sanitation, and vehicle licensing – which were centralised in 2005 and 
2010 respectively. Moreover, the article argues that the victims of centralisation are not only 
Bulawayo (as portrayed in existing studies), but all urban centres that have been centres of 
democratic transition; they are all affected by the ZANU(PF)’s centralisation of governance.  
 
Other than centralisation of urban functions, urban politics in Zimbabwe is manifested in 
various other ways. First, through the use of massive socio-spatial re-engineering exercises 
masked in the name of bringing sanity and order in cities. Yet the main motive seems to be 
political retribution and dilution of perceived opposition strongholds. Such exercises include 
the  Operation  Murambatsvina  or  Restore  Order (OM/RO)  presented  as  a  campaign  ‘to 
eradicate illegal housing and economic activities from the cities although such justifications 
                                                          
3 M. Musemwa, ‘From “Sunshine City” to a Landscape of Disaster: The Politics of Water, Sanitation and Disease in Harare, Zimbabwe, 
1980–2009’, Journal of Developing Societies, 26, 2 (2010), p. 165. 
4 See M. Musemwa, ‘Disciplining a “Dissident” City: Hydropolitics in the City of Bulawayo, Matabeleland, Zimbabwe, 1980–1994’, 
Journal of Southern African Studies, 32, 2 (2006), pp. 239–54. 
5 See M. Musemwa, ‘Early Struggles over Water: From Private to Public Water Utility in the City of Bulawayo, Zimbabwe, 1894–
1924’, Journal of Southern African Studies, 34, 4 (2008), pp. 881–98 
6 See M. Musemwa, Water, History and Politics in Zimbabwe: Bulawayo’s Struggles with the Environment, 1894–2008 (Trenton, 




obscure far deeper economic and political causes’.7  In essence, OM/RO largely shows the 
use of coercion by ZANU(PF) in response to urban discontent toward its rule.8 Sara Rich 
Dorman argues that OM/RO shows the exclusionary nature of urban politics in Zimbabwean 
cities in which urban citizens are seen as ‘politically unreliable’.9 
 
Second, urban politics is expressed through the use of informal and parallel structures to 
perform functions of local authorities. This strategy includes the use of political party 
structures and militia to control and parcel out urban land, and controlling and allocating flea 
markets to loyal ZANU(PF) supporters.10 Access to urban land and markets is therefore 
traded for ZANU(PF) loyalty. In an informal economy like Zimbabwe, access to urban land 
and markets is crucial to one’s survival and livelihood.11 Hence, we suggest that the ruling 
party uses its power to determine who has access to such vital resources in an environment 
where urban unemployment is extremely high. 
 
Third, central government exerts control through the apparently systematic suffocation of 
cities’ access to critical resources for urban expansion, such as land. In the post-2000 era, 
the national government did not transfer state land to urban councils by issuing Deeds of 
Grant. Instead, government allocated state land directly to ZANU(PF) structures, supporters 
and co-operatives through the local government ministry.12 This is more pronounced in 
cities run by the opposition party, such as Harare, Bulawayo and Mutare, among others. In 
this regard, Muchadenyika argues that urban land is a vital political resource used by the 
ZANU(PF) to influence and control urban development and undermine the role and power 
of opposition-run cities.13 
 
Fourth, urban politics is seen in the use and abuse of local government laws by the 
national government to disturb and undermine the power of the MDC in running cities. 
Largely, this includes the appointment of ZANU(PF) loyalists as special interest councillors,14 
the use of the Local Government Board to appoint senior council officials, and the dismissal 
of MDC mayors and councillors.15 Here ZANU(PF) uses its power to determine who runs 
cities. This political strategy has largely weakened the ability of MDC to govern cities, as 
appointed officials wield more power than councillors and mayors. 
 
                                                          
7 D. Potts, ‘“Restoring Order”? Operation Murambatsvina and the Urban Crisis in Zimbabwe’, Journal of Southern African Studies, 32, 
2 (2006), p. 273. 
8 F. Musoni, ‘Operation Murambatsvina and the Politics of Street Vendors in Zimbabwe’, Journal of Southern African Studies, 36, 2 
(2010), pp. 301–17, 
9 S.R. Dorman, ‘“We Have Not Made Anybody Homeless”: Regulation and Control of Urban Life in Zimbabwe’, Citizenship Studies, 
20, 1 (2016), pp. 84–98. 
10 J. McGregor, ‘Surveillance and the City: Patronage, Power-Sharing and the Politics of Urban Control in Zimbabwe’, Journal of 
Southern African Studies, 39, 4 (2013), pp. 783–805. 
11 D. Muchadenyika, ‘Social Movements and Planning Institutions in Urban Transformation: Housing in Metropolitan Harare, 
Zimbabwe (2000–2015)’ (DPhil thesis, University of the Western Cape, 2017). 
12 Ibid. 
13 See Muchadenyika, ‘Land for Housing’. 
14 Special interest councillors were meant ‘to cater for special needs of specific groups such as disabled, business, civil society among 
others’ and ‘provide a caveat for some groups who cannot be fully represented based on elected councillors’. See Muchadenyika and 
Williams, ‘Social Change’, p. 264. 
15 D. Muchadenyika and J.J. Williams, ‘Central–Local State Contestations and Urban Management in Zimbabwe’, Journal of 




It is in these contexts that the move to centralise water provision services and vehicle 
licensing functions can be understood. The article is based on 30 interviews conducted with 
mayors and councillors, administrative heads of city departments, local government 
professionals (within and outside government ministries and departments, international 
development agencies, community-based organisations and civil society organisations) and 
representatives of political parties and research institutes.16 
 
The Politics of Urban Control in Zimbabwe 
The rise of opposition political parties in controlling local governments in the 2000s and 
the struggle by ZANU(PF) to retain political dominance resulted in the centralisation of 
administrative authority and power.17 In this instance, centralisation was an attempt to allow 
government the opportunity to commandeer service delivery at the local level. Other than 
weakening local authorities, centralisation is a strategy to make the central government 
relevant in the daily lives of urban residents, who, in most cases, vote for the opposition 
party in elections.18 
 
In Zimbabwe, centralisation takes three forms. First, there is the transfer of local authority 
functions to government-directed entities. Second, central government has usurped powers 
to influence who is appointed to manage cities. For instance, the abolition of executive 
mayors became a major constraint, as ceremonial mayors have no power to run city 
affairs. The central government has also centralised the recruitment of senior local 
authority executives, who essentially run cities, and this has had significant impact on the 
resultant service delivery. Third, there has been the introduction of new local government 
authorities in the form of provincial governors and district administrators in the 
metropolitan regions of Bulawayo and Harare.19 These government-appointed authorities 
dilute the power and authority of urban local authorities as they control land – a vital 
resource in urban development. 
 
In essence, the centralisation of control and local government functions ‘politicised the 
local state’.20 The MDC controls urban areas, with ZANU(PF) controlling the local 
government ministry, leading to an ardently contested urban governance system. Intense 
contestation marks central–local government relations, leaving the electorate and residents 
confused about the direction of political change.21 Removing ZANU(PF) from managing 
urban areas was expected to be a way to usher in a new urban governance regime centred on 
effective and efficient service delivery. We argue, however, that for now, to some extent, the 
                                                          
16 These are 5 from central government ministries, 6 from local authorities, 5 from urban social movements, 3 from political parties, 6 
from non-governmental organisations and international development agencies, and 5 from consultancy, practising planners and research 
institutes. 
17 W. Jonga, ‘Prioritizing Political Banditry at the Expense of Good Governance: Rethinking Urban Governance in Zimbabwe’, 
International Journal of Humanities and Social Sciences, 2, 24 (2012), pp. 117–35. 
18 Muchadenyika and Williams, ‘Social Change’. 
19 T.O. Ranger, ‘City versus State in Zimbabwe: Colonial Antecedents of the Current Crisis’, Journal of Eastern African Studies, 1, 2 
(2007), 161–92.  
20 McGregor, ‘Surveillance and the City’, p. 788. 
21 D. Muchadenyika, ‘Contestation, Confusion and Change: Urban Governance and Service Delivery in Zimbabwe (2000–2012’) 




new urban governance regime has shown unexpected results, mainly due to 
intergovernmental and inter-party contestations. 
 
Between 2000 and 2012, the MDC control of urban centres increased at each election. For 
instance, in the 2008 elections, the MDC won 29 out of 30 urban councils with ZANU(PF) 
winning only one.22 Such a political reality turned urban administration into ‘political 
battlegrounds rather than avenues of service delivery’.23 
 
The commencement of the Inclusive Government in 2009 brought two institutional shifts 
that are relevant in understanding urban politics. First, the government ordered the return 
of water and sanitation functions to urban local authorities. Perhaps this was an attempt 
to transfer the water infrastructure burden to the opposition, which had won 29 of the 30 
urban local authorities.  The  opposition  was  also  in  charge  of  other  basic  services,  such  
as education  and  health,  which  had  all  but  collapsed.  At the same time, the MDC was 
responsible for the water ministry at the national level. 
 
Second, the economic gains made during the Inclusive Government (2009–13) led to a 
sharp increase in car ownership in cities. Thus urban local authorities were receiving 
considerable revenue from vehicle licensing fees. In 2010, the national government, through 
the Zimbabwe National Road Administration (ZINARA), took over the vehicle licensing 
function from urban local authorities. It was under the Inclusive Government that toll gates 
were installed on all the country’s major national roads as a strategy to fund road 
infrastructure maintenance. Between 2009 and 2013, urban political contestations centred 
mainly on access to and use of resources such as revenue and land. 
 
After 2013, the ZANU(PF) regained exclusive control of the national government and 
made inroads in reclaiming some urban centres. However, city–state tensions continue 
primarily over the distribution of resources and sharing of functions. On 7 July 2015, Robert 
Mugabe’s cabinet reshuffle changed the politics of urban control from primarily inter-party 
to intra-party politics. Ignatius Chombo’s reign as local government minister came to an end 
after 15 years and he was replaced by Saviour Kasukuwere (also appointed ZANU[PF] 
National Political Commissar [NPC] in January 2015). Chombo’s reign was characterised by 
the controversial dismissal of MDC mayors and councillors, OM/RO, the appointment of 
ZANU(PF)-aligned city commissions and a ‘trail of ruin’ and ‘poor service delivery’.24 
 
Being in charge of traditional leaders and 92 local authorities, controlling 1,958 ward 
councillors and being ZANU(PF)’s NPC made Kasukuwere powerful in both government 
and the party. Saviour Kasukuwere began a process of entrenching his political interests 
through a systematic purge of senior local authority officials appointed during the Chombo 
era. Affected were City of Harare and Mutare town clerks, and a number of directors within 
                                                          
22 S. Chakaipa, ‘Local Government Institutions and Elections’, in J. de Visser, N. Steytler and N. Machinguta (eds), Local Government 
Reform in Zimbabwe: A Policy Dialogue (Cape Town, UWC Community Law Centre, 2010), p. 60. 
23 Muchadenyika and Williams, ‘Social Change’, p. 263. 




the City of Harare were either forced to resign or retrenched. The argument presented to the 
public was cost-cutting and transparent city leadership. However, with time, such posts were 
refilled. This, we argue, is a political strategy to appoint people loyal to the new local 
government minister, using transparency as a facade. 
 
The subsequent filling of town clerk vacancies created animosity between the local 
government minister and MDC councillors. In March 2016, for instance, the City of Harare 
mayor and councillors appointed businessman James Mushore as the new town clerk. However, 
the appointment was highly contested and failed to take effect, as the local government minister 
refused to authorise the appointment. From June 2015 to date, the City of Harare is run by an 
acting town clerk, as councillors and the local government minister are in disagreement on who 
to appoint. In Harare, the MDC tried to use the opportunity of the change of the local 
government minister to entrench its interests and influence the appointment of a new 
generation of senior city officials. But it faced resistance from the new local government 
minister. 
 
Kasukuwere’s reign as local government minister and NPC began to show clear signs of high 
political ambitions – through replacing city officials with loyal ones, commissioning 
investigations in city affairs (Harare, Mutare and Gweru) and purging those perceived to be 
from a different faction within ZANU(PF). To curtail Kasukuwere’s power as local 
government minister, Robert Mugabe created a new ministry called Rural Development, 
Preservation and Promotion of Culture and Heritage, which took over 60 rural local 
authorities and traditional leadership from the local government ministry’s mandate. This 
sequence of events suggests that, after the 2013 elections, the politics of urban control is 
largely determined by factions within ZANU(PF). 
 
Zimbabwe’s 2013 Constitution provides  for devolution of  powers and functions and 
recognises three tiers of government, namely national, provincial and local. As such, the 
Constitution provides for an Act of Parliament to provide and elaborate on the nature, 
structure and composition of devolution. The United Nations Development Programme 
(UNDP), through its Capacity Building and Service Delivery Programme, supported the 
local government law reform process. The process was highly contentious, with local 
authority officials clashing with local government ministry officials on how to implement 
devolution in practice. In August 2014, the Local Government All Stakeholders conference 
concluded that: ‘[d]elegates felt that centralisation will continue if the new laws did not 
sufficiently operationalise the 2013 Constitution’.25 Furthermore, local government 
stakeholders voiced concern on the contents of the new local government bills, stating that: 
 
[t]he definition or the powers/competences of the President and Minister need to be 
elaborated in the new local government laws cognisant of the spirit and letter of 
devolution and particular attention given to ensuring citizen participation and the 
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constitutionally enshrined rights of the Provincial/Metropolitan and Local Authorities ‘to 
govern on [their] own initiative’… . The significant and substantive reference to the 
Minister in the proposed bills raised anxiety as this was potentially sending the message 
that the current ‘parent–child’ relations would continue despite the 2013 constitution.26 
 
Submissions from local government stakeholders were clearly ignored. Rather, the 
ZANU(PF)’s centralisation ideology is evident in the 2016 Local Government Laws 
Amendment Act. The Act was supposed to detail the scope and depth of devolution, 
providing functions and procedures of local authorities.27 But the Local Government Laws 
Amendment Act only deals with one thing – ‘suspension and removal of councillors from 
office’.28 To reduce a whole constitutional chapter on provincial and local government to 
one thing – ‘suspension and removal of councillors from office’ – we argue, indicates that 
the ZANU(PF) government is not ideologically fit and ready to promote a devolved and 
developmental system of governance in the country. Instead, the government is preoccupied 
with control and making local governments subservient to the national government. 
 
Centralisation of Water and Sanitation 
After the establishment of major towns in the 19th century, urban local authorities in 
Rhodesia were responsible for providing water and sanitation services. This continued in the 
post-independence era, with the Public Health Act (Chapter 15.09) and Urban Councils Act 
(Chapter 29.15) providing the legal basis for local authorities to deliver and assure quality of 
water and sanitation services in urban centres. As part of water governance reforms, the 
Zimbabwe National Water Authority (ZINWA) was created in 1998 through the ZINWA 
Act. ZINWA’s main functions are to advise government on the formulation of national 
policies and standards on water resources planning, management and development; water 
quality, pollution control and environmental protection; hydrology and hydrogeology; dam 
safety, borehole drilling and water pricing.29 
 
In the 1990s and 2000s, topical issues on urban water were clean water provision and the 
sourcing of water treatment chemicals. The crippling economic challenges and urbanisation 
affected the technical and financial capacity of local authorities to perform water and 
sanitation delivery functions. The national government continuously provided grants through 
quasi-fiscal operations to assist local authorities in water supply. After 2000, the supply of 
water treatment chemicals became a key source of tension. The national government and 
ZANU(PF) politicians had preferred suppliers who were, in most instances, linked to the 
ruling party.30 On the other hand, MDC mayors and councillors preferred either apolitical 
suppliers or those aligned to the MDC. 
 
                                                          
26 Ibid., p. 4. 
27 D. Muchadenyika, ‘The Inevitable: Devolution in Zimbabwe – From Constitution-Making to the Future’, in J. de Visser, N. Steytler, 
D. Powell and E. Durojaye (eds), Constitution-Building in Africa (Baden-Baden, Nomos Verlag and Community Law Centre, 2015), p. 
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28 Government of Zimbabwe, Local Government Laws Amendment Act, 2016 (Harare, Government Printer, 2016). 
29 Government of Zimbabwe, Zimbabwe National Water Authority Act, Chapter 20:05 (Harare, Government Printer, 1998). 
30 For details on how state contracts are awarded to ZANU(PF) companies, see M. Dawson and T. Kelsall, ‘Anti-Developmental 




Prior to the government of Zimbabwe’s 9 May 2005 directive, urban local authorities 
were responsible for the delivery of water and sanitation services. However, the 
aforementioned directive compelled all urban local authorities to transfer water and 
sanitation functions to one government entity – ZINWA. Directives are an important tool to 
propagate and enforce government ideas and interests at the local level. These directives 
override council decisions and are commonly used in cementing government power in local 
government.31 
 
Since independence, water has contributed the largest percentage of council revenue, 
making it a cash cow to local authorities.32 In 2006, for example, for the three cities of 
Bulawayo, Harare and Mutare, the average contribution of the water account to the total 
budget was 71.7 per cent.33 At the same time, water and sewerage infrastructure constituted 
more than 60 per cent of urban assets.34 These statistics buttress the argument in this 
article that centralisation is a strategy to control and access financial resources generated 
from urban residents. At the same time, the sphere of influence of urban local authorities 
was weakened, as ‘water and sewer infrastructure were transferred at no cost’.35 
 
From the above, the takeover made ZINWA a huge cash resource, ‘where ZANU(PF) 
would occasionally take the revenue to finance its activities’.36 Following this argument, the 
shift of water and sanitation functions from local authorities to ZINWA ‘show government’s 
desire to directly control water revenue rather than technical reasons’.37 Taking over the 
control of water from local authorities meant that central government and, by extension, the 
ruling party had control of the running of city affairs. This assertion affirms Swyngedouw’s 
view that ‘controlling of the flow of water implies controlling the city, as, without the 
uninterrupted flowing of water, the city’s metabolism would come to a halt’.38 Erratic water 
supply characterised urban areas, though local authorities could do nothing, as they had lost 
control over the production and supply of water. 
 
The local government ministry supported the takeover of water and sanitation functions, 
‘something that most local authorities were not expecting from the parent ministry’.39 This, 
we argue, is also a result of the lack of clear and respected functional distinction between the 
local and national government. However, the City of Bulawayo refused to hand over water 
and sanitation functions to ZINWA. As such, city officials in Harare, Mutare and Masvingo 
                                                          
31 Overall, local authorities view government directives as dangerous, paralysing councils. See ‘Local Authorities Gang Up Against 
Chombo’, NewsDay, Harare, 20 June 2011. For details on the role of directives in local authorities, see C.T. Chigwata, V.V. 
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32 B. Coutinho, ‘Sources of Local Government Funding’, in Visser, Steytler and Machingauta (eds), Local Government Reform in 
Zimbabwe, pp. 71–86  
33 Bulawayo, 71per cent; Harare, 89 per cent and Mutare, 55 per cent. See Parliament of Zimbabwe (hereafter PoZ), ‘Second Report of 
the Portfolio Committee on Local Government on the Takeover of Water and Sewerage Services’, PoZ Senate Proceedings, Wednesday, 
11 April 2007 (Harare, Parliament of Zimbabwe, 2007). 
34 See ibid. 
35 Muchadenyika and Williams, ‘Social Change’, p. 263. 
36 Interview with political analyst, Harare, 6 June 2013. All interviews for this article were conducted by Davison Muchadenyika. 
37 Interview with NGO director, Harare, 6 June 2013. 
38 E. Swyngedouw, Social Power and the Urbanisation of Water: Flows of Power (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2004), p. 45. 




view the City of Bulawayo as not having political problems of the magnitude in other 
cities.40 It should be remembered that the ‘intensity of the opposition of ZINWA’s overtures 
in Bulawayo has its antecedents in the rejection of Bulawayo Waterworks Company by the 
municipality in the formative years of Bulawayo’.41 Bulawayo Waterworks Company was a 
private company responsible for water in Bulawayo between 1894 and 1924. 
 
From the above, we argue that the rejection of ZINWA in Bulawayo is premised on three 
pillars. First, of all the cities, Bulawayo enjoys greater autonomy in terms of city 
management affairs. Thus we argue that the difference between Bulawayo and Harare is that 
the former is significantly divorced from central government while the latter is run as an 
extension of the national government. Second, since independence in 1980, politicians and 
professionals from Bulawayo have displayed unity in repelling central government moves 
deemed detrimental. Thus the combined resistance from politicians across the political 
divide, residents, civil society and city officials was instrumental in resisting ZINWA’s 
takeover in Bulawayo. 
 
Third, the droughts during the 1980s and 1990s in Bulawayo raised critical awareness 
among residents on the value of water in the city. Whoever wants to tamper with water there 
is deemed an ‘enemy’. The conceptualisation of water in the city triggered collective 
resistance against ZINWA. But the situation is different in the other major cities, including 
Masvingo, Harare, and Mutare, with water issues becoming topical only during and after the 
2008 cholera outbreak. 
 
Our interviewees indicated that the takeover of water and sewerage functions showed a 
‘power battle’.42 The evidence for this is the transfer of assets from urban local authorities to 
ZINWA, circumventing legal compliance issues such as asset valuations. ZINWA was selling 
bulk water to the City of Harare from a City of Harare dam – an unusual institutional 
arrangement that brought tensions. Politicians of that time saw ‘water as a game changer’,43 
with whoever was controlling water seen as powerful. The state saw itself ‘as mighty and 
powerful and that it can do anything’.44 Thus the government of Zimbabwe ‘continued to 
treat ZINWA as an extension of itself, financially propping it up, and defending it to the hilt 
even in the face of palpable operational deficiencies, to further its political objectives’.45 The 
central government saw water as a national asset that could not be entrusted to the 
opposition party. Nevertheless, the Urban Councils Act was not changed, as it was only a 
policy directive from central government. In other words, according to Section 168 (powers 
of council in regard to sewerage and drainage) and Section 183 (powers of council in 
relation to water supply) of the Urban Councils Act, urban councils are still mandated to 
provide water and sanitation services in their areas of jurisdiction. 
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41 Musemwa, Water, History and Politics, p. xxvii. 
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43 Interview with former city planner, Masvingo, 10 June 2013. 
44 Interview with senior planning consultant, Bulawayo, 17 June 2013. 




At the takeover by ZINWA, local authorities were struggling to deliver water. In light of this, 
one can argue that central government tried to reduce the burden on local authorities. 
ZINWA was managing catchment areas, providing water to government institutions and 
rural local authorities prior to the May 2005 directive. Water is managed as a cycle, and 
therefore it can be argued that the takeover of water was a comprehensive water 
management attempt. Despite this, Manzungu and Mabhiza found that the election of the 
MDC to run the City of Harare subsequently saw water being a political issue with the local 
government ministry undermining opposition-led councils.46 A 2002 study in the City of 
Mutare concluded that politicians meddled in water issues in the city, as ‘this will portray 
them as the provider of a life-giving resource that enhances health, security and 
prosperity’.47 In spite of this, our argument goes beyond merely identifying political 
motivations behind the ZINWA takeover. We also include ideological inclinations and the 
battle to control and access water revenue. 
 
The historical antecedents of central government taking over council functions at zero cost 
were also witnessed in the delivery of energy services, long before party politics was an issue 
in local elections. In 1986, cities of Harare and Bulawayo power stations were taken over 
by the Zimbabwe Electricity Supply Authority (ZESA), a central government- controlled 
entity, at zero cost. Thus, besides political motives during centralisation since 2000, we 
argue that the ZANU(PF) government believes in centralisation as a political strategy 
and tool of organising the state. Such an ideological stance led to the national 
government taking over functions such as health, education and energy in the 1980s and 
1990s. This is despite weak government capacity to deliver such functions.48 Thus, we argue 
here that the government’s belief in centralisation is a vital element in explaining post-2000 
politics of urban control. In this instance, conventional analyses of seeing centralisation as a 
political struggle between ZANU(PF) and MDC are therefore not sufficient. 
 
ZINWA and the Delivery of Water and Sanitation Services 
Centralisation of water and sanitation functions had severe impacts on the delivery of water 
and sanitation services in Zimbabwe’s cities. Chief among these were the collapse of service 
delivery and revenue collection, severe human resources challenges and the deterioration of 
water assets. Central government failed to administer ZINWA, as evidenced by the collapse 
of water and sanitation services nationwide. The supply of water in Harare, for example, 
became more erratic following the ZINWA takeover: there was repeated bursting of major 
water pipelines.49 
 
In other words, ZINWA lacked technical and financial capacity to manage water and 
sanitation services. The government entity was inexperienced, under-capacitated and too 
                                                          
46 E. Manzungu and C. Mabiza, ‘Status of Water Governance in Urban Areas in Zimbabwe: Some Preliminary Observations from the 
City of Harare’, Physics and Chemistry of the Earth, 29, 15–18 (2004), pp. 1167–72. 
47 B. Gumbo, and P. van der Zaag, ‘Water Losses and the Political Constraints to Demand Management: The Case of the City of Mutare, 
Zimbabwe’, Physics and Chemistry of the Earth, 27, 11–12 (2002), p. 812. 
48 D. Muchadenyika, ‘Civil Society, Social Accountability and Service Delivery in Zimbabwe’, Development Policy Review, 35, S2 
(2017), pp. O178–O195. 
49 I. Chirisa and W. Jonga, ‘Urban Local Governance in the Crucible: Empirical Overtones of Central Government Meddling in Local 




political, in that the delivery of safe, clean water to residents was secondary.50 The shift to 
ZINWA was at the expense of urban residents, who suffered water-borne diseases and water 
rationing. The United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) drilled hand-pump boreholes in 
most cities to mitigate the situation. In short, the takeover by ZINWA was a ‘litmus test by 
the ZANU(PF) government to have a stake in service delivery to urban residents though it 
turned out to be a nightmare’.51 
 
ZINWA personnel were ‘poorly remunerated compared to when under local authorities, 
affecting personnel morale and performance’.52 Even to this day, there is a personnel crisis 
still unresolved, as some urban local authorities refused to take back the politically 
appointed staff.53 In towns and cities where ZINWA still manages water, ZINWA sells bulk 
water to local authorities at exorbitant rates. However, such local authorities pass the cost to 
residents, portraying contestation in water management.54 
 
Water billing services remained in the hands of urban local authorities, with ZINWA 
mandated with the production and supply of water. This arrangement seriously challenged 
institutional co-ordination. Local authorities had not willingly surrendered water and 
sanitation services, and ‘therefore were sabotaging ZINWA’.55 The sabotage was 
demonstrated by poor and inconsistent water billing by local authorities, which resulted in a 
sharp decline in revenue handed over to ZINWA.56 
 
We argue that the national government’s centralisation of water and sanitation  was largely 
retrogressive. ZINWA was characterised by the looting and mismanagement of water 
infrastructure. Such looting included the wanton removal of water pumps ‘from urban local 
authorities (for instance Ruwa) and installing them on farms owned by top ZANU(PF) 
officials’.57 This illustrates that access to resources is a key driver of centralisation in 
Zimbabwe. In essence, assets were taken over by ZINWA, but liabilities were mainly returned 
to urban councils. In Mutare, for instance, the town clerk felt that ZINWA had vandalised 
infrastructure, as ZINWA inherited 85 per cent of the infrastructure in good working 
order but handed it back with only 45 per cent functional.58 
 
To substantiate government’s rushed decision and the politicisation of such decision, we 
cite the Auditor and Comptroller General’s 2007 report.59 The report shows the extent of 
ZINWA’s incapacity in delivering its mandate even before taking over from urban local 
authorities. But the government ignored these findings and recommendations. The Auditor 
and Comptroller General revealed that: 
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[m]y audit revealed that ZINWA was failing to provide undisrupted water supply and 
water of the right quality to its customers in small towns, growth points and institutional 
customers such as Prison Services, Zimbabwe Republic Police and the Defence Forces … 
My visits to the water treatment stations in the catchment areas revealed that 
maintenance of plant and equipment was not being done according to standards set by 
management, and according to the manufacturer's specifications … Based on the station 
inspections which I conducted in the catchment areas, I concluded that maintenance was 
not being taken as a priority by the authority. I observed that pumps and pipes were 
rusty and leaking and not all gate valves were working … The tanks (reservoirs) were not 
cleaned at regular intervals. The walls of treatment tanks at most stations were almost 
falling apart due to cracks and leakages caused by lack of maintenance.60 
 
In comparison to local authorities, ZINWA performed worse as the water crisis became 
more pronounced, until the government reversed its policy.61 The policy reversal is an 
admission of failure by government to control the supply of urban water through 
ZINWA. Water and sanitation challenges had become a serious security threat with the 
potential  to  destabilise  ZANU(PF)  rule.  Government admitted the incapacity of ZINWA: 
 
[t]he capacity of ZINWA to effectively manage water supply and sewer reticulation 
throughout the country’s urban centres is severely overstretched. The centralisation of 
water management in ZINWA has been characterised by bureaucratic inefficiencies, 
leading to low staff morale … Government is, therefore, decentralising the management of 
water to local authorities with effect from 1 February 2009. This entails that ZINWA 
reverts back to its status prior to the directive of 9 May 2005. Accordingly, ZINWA and 
local authorities should begin the processes for smooth hand over and take over transfers.62 
 
However, local authorities were in the weakest position to deliver water and sanitation 
services after taking over from ZINWA. Despite this, the Parliament of Zimbabwe reported 
that ‘since it [the City of Harare] took over the provision of water from ZINWA, water 
supply to residents had improved by 76.67 per cent from 300 mega litres to 530 mega litres 
per day and the number of people [with] access [to] potable water increased by 70 per cent 
from 2 million in June 2009 to 3.4 million in January 2010’.63 To date, urban local 
authorities such as Plumtree, Karoi, Gokwe and Mvurwi, among others, are still engaged in 
a contest with ZINWA over the management of water and sanitation. 64 
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Water, Sanitation and Urban Residents 
Here we explore the impacts of the centralisation of water and sanitation to urban residents. 
ZINWA did not properly manage the water resources and infrastructure. Water charges 
increased more than tenfold but without any noticeable changes in water supply and 
quality.65 Frequent bursting of water pipes was driven by a lack of maintenance skills, 
knowledge and experience on the part of the new authority. In many suburbs, such as 
Crowborough, Glen Norah and Glen View (Harare), water became severely rationed and 
used to be provided on two days per week. Residents were supplied with unclean, unsafe 
water because the ‘contracts with companies which used to supply the City of Harare with 
water chemicals were terminated with new found suppliers failing to meet the demand’.66 
Residents were the worst affected, as a town planner pointed out: ‘[t]hey are the ones who 
went for days, months, and years without running water. They are the ones who experienced 
raw sewage gushing out of sewer pipes. They are the ones who had to look for alternative 
sources of clean water.67 Residents succumbed to diseases like cholera and typhoid. The 
cholera outbreak claimed 4,000 lives68 – the highest fatality rate in Africa for 15 years.69 
However, Part 9 (sanitation and housing) of the Public Health Act compels local authorities 
to prevent or remedy danger to health arising from ‘any well or other source of water supply 
or any cistern or other receptacle of water, whether public or private, the water which is used 
or likely to be used by man for drinking or domestic purposes’.70 Thus local authorities were 
hamstrung and could not fulfil the mandate of delivering safe, clean, reliable water. The 
situation in urban areas began to resemble that in rural areas, characterised by deep 
boreholes and shallow wells as the primary sources of water for most residents: a reversal of 
decades of urban infrastructural development. These wells were widely condemned as 
having contaminated water, which gave rise to water-borne diseases.71 
 
The absence of a centralised water authority created by the handing over of water supply 
functions from ZINWA to local authorities created some problems of co-ordination in 
sharing water resources and infrastructure between local authorities. This is shown in the 
case of Rockview housing project, developed by Shelter Zimbabwe in Epworth: 
 
[o]n 20 May 2008, Shelter Zimbabwe submitted an application to ZINWA for a water 
connection from the existing 350-mm ZINWA Ventersburg–Ruwa main that runs parallel 
to Harare–Marondera railway line. On 9 September 2008, ZINWA approved the water 
connection of Rockview Park to the Ruwa main. In 2009 ZINWA handed over water 
supply services to local authorities. City of Harare and Ruwa refused to recognise the 
connection of the project to the Ruwa main, arguing that ZINWA made an error: it should 
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have consulted the two councils prior to granting the connection … City of Harare, 
Epworth local board and Ruwa local board should have developed a common 
infrastructure that would service Zimre Park, Sunway City, Rockview Park and other 
upcoming housing projects in Epworth, Ruwa and Harare. To have the Shelter Zimbabwe 
bulk water line crossing the Sunway City bulk water line and all getting supplies from the 
same source is an act of gross lack of integrated planning of off-site infrastructure by local 
authorities concerned.72 
 
Here we argue that there is essentially no attention given to integrated planning of water 
resource infrastructure: for instance, between developments in proximate areas but under 
different local authority jurisdiction. However, ZINWA was a central body that provided a 
platform for integrated infrastructure planning, development and sharing of water resources 
between local authorities. 
 
When ZINWA took over water and sanitation functions, it employed local authorities to bill 
and collect water charges. Revenue collection systems went down ‘as local authorities were 
not collecting the charges properly, as a way of sabotaging ZINWA’.73 When water and 
sanitation services were handed back to local authorities, local authorities revised the 
revenue collection system. As a result, bills increased and residents were unable to pay, 
though central government interfered through ordering local authorities to scrap all 
outstanding  bills.74   However,  such  political  interference  affected  the  viability  of  local 
authorities, as it ‘increased the number of people not willing to pay’.75 In summary, 
ZINWA’s operational deficiencies and lack of financial and technical capacity76 meant that 
residents suffered most, owing to political struggles over the control of water in urban areas. 
 
Centralisation of Vehicle Licensing 
The centralisation of vehicle licensing reinforces our argument that revenue needs must be 
considered alongside political issues in analysing the motivation for the centralisation of 
services. This section examines the effects of the government’s centralisation of vehicle 
licensing functions. The history of local authorities collecting vehicle licensing fees dates 
back to the mid 20th century. For example, the City of Harare started collecting vehicle 
license fees in 1961. The Vehicle Registration and Licensing Act (VRLA) (13.14) recognises 
local authorities as Roads Authorities with the power to collect vehicle licensing revenue. 
Section 31 (1) of the VRLA gives powers to the minister responsible for transport to grant 
powers and permission to local authorities to charge license fees for vehicles ordinarily kept 
at night in their jurisdictions.77 The beneficiaries of vehicle license fees are local authorities, 
acting on behalf of the Road Fund. 
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Since its formation in 2001, ZINARA was ‘responsible for reviewing annual work programs and 
budgets submitted by the road authorities and consolidating them into a single national 
road maintenance work programme’.78 However, the contest for  urban control led to the 
centralisation of vehicle licensing, though it further strained centre–local state relations.79 We 
argue, again, that such centralisation was not primarily about undermining political opponents 
who had gained control over the urban councils, but is explained by central government’s need 
to control financial resources generated from predominantly urban residents. Between 2009 
and 2010, the country’s passenger vehicle fleet increased from 500,000 to about 600,000, 
the largest yearly increase since 2000.80 Such figures suggest that vehicle licensing is a 
significant revenue source. By 2020, the African Development Bank projections indicate that 
a total of US$245million will be realised from vehicle licenses fees annually.81 The failure of 
the formal economy has seen the ZANU(PF) government devising new ways of raising 
revenue through taking over local authority functions. 
 
The VRLA mandates local authorities to collect and administer vehicle license fees. 
Section 31 (2) of the VRLA provides that: 
 
[t]he proceeds of fees charged, levied and collected in terms of subsection (1) shall after 
deduction by the local authority of any administrative fees fixed by the Road 
Administration in terms of section 54, be held by the local authority on behalf of the 
Road Fund and be used by the local authority in a manner approved by the Road 
Administration.82 
 
It is recognised that local authorities in Zimbabwe had been collecting motor vehicle 
license fees with some degree of success.83 In theory, the relationship between the Road 
Fund and local authorities is meant to bolster checks and balances – each entity should 
account to the other. 
 
Local authorities (rural and urban) are designated as autonomous under the Roads Act 
(Chapter 13.18), with autonomy in the management of road infrastructure services in their 
areas of jurisdiction.84 In 2010, however, local authorities were ‘surprised to learn that the 
license fees collection functions had been removed and placed into the hands of the 
Zimbabwe Posts (ZIMPOST) with no formal communication from the ZINARA or the 
Ministry of Transport, Communication and Infrastructure Development’.85 Rather, vehicle 
licensing functions were taken away from local authorities to the ZINARA through a 
government directive.86 This is despite the fact that, according to section 52 of the VRLA, 
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such actions require a Statutory Instrument. The Statutory Instrument to effect this change 
was gazetted only in 2013.87 
 
The purpose of vehicle licensing fees is to maintain road infrastructure. But some local 
authorities were using roads funds for administrative purposes.88 It can be argued that the 
centralisation of vehicle licensing through the ZINARA was an attempt to reduce the abuse 
of vehicle license funds by local authorities. Nevertheless, the association of local authorities 
argues that ‘the transport ministry used an excuse of one rural local authority (Wedza) which 
misused vehicle licensing funds as the reason for withdrawing the function from local 
authorities’.89 In that regard, section 32 (1) of the VRLA provides for circumstances where 
the minister responsible for transport may collect fees on behalf of the local authority: 
 
[i]f in the opinion of the Minister, a local authority fails or is unable to collect all or any 
part of the fees payable to it in terms of this Act, the Minister may undertake the 
collection of such fees on behalf of the local authority and recover from such local 
authority any costs incurred by him in that connection.90 
 
However, this is not what obtains in Zimbabwe. Therefore we contend that the Ministry of 
Transport should have conducted an assessment of the 92 local authorities to determine 
the state of roads funds abuse. Such an assessment could have assisted in selecting local 
authorities where the ministry can collect vehicle license fees on behalf of such local 
authorities. The lack of such a credible assessment gives room to argue that the government 
has an ulterior motive in taking over vehicle licensing functions. 
 
There are two reasons that can justify government takeover of vehicle licensing functions. 
First, poor accounting systems: ‘there were incidences of fake vehicle licenses depriving 
local authorities of revenue’.91 Second, the enforcement of vehicle licensing by local 
authorities through the municipal police was weak, resulting in low revenue collected. Based 
on these two reasons, one can argue that poor management by local authorities was 
responsible for the decision taken by the government. However, local authorities are of the 
view that each local authority ‘should have been advised of its shortcomings before such 
drastic actions were taken and that the current arrangement of distributing funds through 
the ZINARA is unsustainable’.92 
 
In the view of our interviewees, the idea of centralisation by the government was ‘premised 
on power, control and opportunities for rents’.93 ZINARA became an instrument in the 
hands of the government to centralise vehicle license fee collection, as the government lacked 
                                                          
87 GoZ, Statutory Instrument 141 of 2013: Vehicle Registration and Licensing (Amendment) Regulations, 2013 (No. 15), (Harare, 
Government Printer, 2013). 
88 For instance, paying for salaries. 
89 Interview with Urban Councils Association official, Harare, 26 June 2013. 
90 GoZ, Vehicle Registration and Licensing Act (emphasis added). 
91 Interview with city official, Harare, 10 June 2013. 
92 ZILGA, ‘Position Paper on Vehicle Licensing’, p. 2. 
93 Interview with planning consultant, Masvingo, 17 June 2013. For a detailed analysis of economic rents and ZANU(PF) rule, see 




the financial capacity to maintain rural roads. Thus, taking the function from local 
authorities is a strategy to spread road funds across the country.94 In essence, the transport 
ministry, through ZINARA, skews allocation of vehicle licensing funds to ZANU(PF) 
strongholds.95 This is mainly because, at present, there is no defined and credible formula 
for sharing funds among the 92 local authorities. As such, ZINARA plays a redistribution 
role to all local authorities irrespective of the number of cars, road coverage and state of the 
road network. Consequently, the City of Harare ‘publicly expresses its displeasure with the 
revenue allocation processes’.96 Here we argue that centralisation of vehicle licensing 
through ZINARA is a strategy to harness urban-generated resources and distribute them to 
rural areas loyal to the ruling party. Thus the divide in terms of rural–urban politics is also 
manifested in the centralisation of vehicle licensing. 
 
Allocation by ZINARA does not take into account the geographical concentration of 
license payers and vehicles. Thus the vehicle licensing takeover disconnected licensing from 
the city’s capacity to maintain its road network. But decentralisation of roles and 
responsibilities remained (road maintenance remains the function of local authorities), with 
revenue centralised. Therefore central government interference in road management through 
ZINARA affects the ability of local authorities to repair and maintain  roads  through vehicle 
licensing. 
 
Urban local authorities are of the view that ‘where they are making some revenue, central 
government takes over the function’.97 Six council officials argued that central government 
had no reliable revenue streams and therefore vehicle licensing became an easy option in 
response to government ‘bankruptcy’.98 Thus ZANU(PF) tried to take political life out of 
urban areas through ‘centralising possible revenue streams for MDC-run councils’.99 One 
can argue that ZINARA is an attempt to under-resource urban councils: the councils fail to 
get enough revenue to service urban areas, and their failure is often ascribed to MDC-run 
councils. Urban areas are battlefields by virtue of being run by the MDC: ‘every aspect of it – 
be it water, road maintenance, and housing – are contested and politicised’.100 
 
Central government’s continued centralisation of functions affects the service delivery 
capacities of urban local authorities. In light of this, local authorities are reduced to carrying 
out administrative work, as central government persistently grabs their substantive 
functions.101 With access to vehicle licensing revenue, ‘the party [MDC] would make 
significant developments in infrastructure development, and ZANU(PF) would be seen as a 
failure’.102 In this regard, the City of Bulawayo mayor argued that, if vehicle licensing was to 
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be returned to local authorities, they were going to transform the status of roads in 
urban areas.103 
 
Apart from politics, two questions arise: previously, when urban local authorities had vehicle 
licensing responsibility, what did they achieve? And how are the ZINARA funds accounted 
for? While local authorities were carrying out routine maintenance, evidence also suggests the 
use of road funds for other administrative expenses. Nevertheless, it is clear that ZINARA is ‘a 
mechanism that ensures funds from vehicle licensing are used for road maintenance and not 
salaries of local authorities’ personnel’.104 Despite this, other rural local authorities are still 
abusing funds allocated to them for road maintenance by ZINARA.105 
 
Though it collects revenue from motorists, ZINARA has no accountability framework to 
them. There is no pressure for it ‘since it does not have any constituency except being part 
of a central government ministry’.106 The efficiency and corporate accountability of 
ZINARA is weak. Moreover, ZINARA is not sufficiently separate from central government, 
causing the entity to be seen as a ‘revenue generating vehicle for central government’.107 
Further, ZINARA funds are not properly accounted for, as it is alleged that ‘US$20 million 
is reported to have vanished’.108 The 2011 Auditor General’s report corroborates the finding 
of poor accounting systems in the administration of ZINARA funds. 
 
In my 2010 report, I mentioned that the Ministry (of  transport  and  infrastructure 
development) failed to account for funds amounting to US$2,751,872. The same problem 
persisted in 2011. The Zimbabwe National Roads Administration (ZINARA) financial 
statements, showed a disbursement of US$16,199,546 to the Department of Roads Fund 
for maintenance of roads throughout the country. However, according  to the Fund’s 
financial statements, only US$10,650,579 was received from ZINARA. The two figures 
could not be reconciled and I was not able to determine which figure was accurate.109 
 
ZIMPOST, the national postal operator and a government entity, was the first to be 
designated an agent to collect vehicle license fees on behalf of ZINARA.110 At the time, 
government realised that it faced the ‘collapse of ZIMPOST, despite having huge 
infrastructure around the country’.111 It was essential to rescue ZIMPOST and therefore 
government took over the function (of collecting vehicle licenses) from local authorities. 
From the above, we argue that centralisation of local authority functions allowed the rescue 
of government agencies, in this case preventing the looming collapse of ZIMPOST. 
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ZINARA and Road Infrastructure Maintenance 
The Zimbabwe National Road Administration primarily maintains national rather than 
urban roads, though not comprehensively. In fact, the entity tends to patch up roads 
rather than overseeing a complete overhaul of the road infrastructure network. A senior 
planning consultant argued that ZINARA is looking at ‘one’s face and not the rest of the 
body’.112 Access roads in all cities are derelict and unattended to. However, motorists often 
‘accuse councils and not ZINARA for not maintaining city roads’.113 This has a tendency to 
strain relations between local authorities and residents. 
 
The allocation of ZINARA funds from both toll gates and vehicle licensing is questionable, 
as some ‘local authorities in ZANU(PF) strongholds have benefited more than big cities’.114 
As such, revenue collected in major cities such as Harare and Bulawayo benefits people 
in other areas who might not have contributed. However, it appears to be no coincidence 
that ZINARA is an institution used to raise revenue from opposition strongholds and 
distribute to constituencies loyal to the ZANU(PF). Rather, it is a strategy in an environment 
where the key rural development institution responsible for maintaining rural roads – the 
District Development Fund – has all but collapsed. 
 
From January to June 2016, ZINARA collected US$74.6 million, with US$69.4million 
disbursed.115 Disbursements to road authorities (local authorities) amounted to a paltry 
US$14.8 million (19.8 per cent). However, the expenses incurred by ZINARA amounted to 
35 per cent.116 This demonstrates that ZINARA is a costly structure that is consuming huge 
resources, which could be used for road maintenance. Of the US$26 million collected from 
vehicle license fees between January and June 2016, only about 38.8 per cent had been 
disbursed to local authorities.117 The difference between collections and disbursements 
indicates the operational inefficiencies of ZINARA. Disbursements to the City of Harare 
(see Table 1) show how ZINARA is suffocating road maintenance in cities. 
 
The government’s budget allocation for road maintenance in local authorities is disbursed 
through ZINARA. For the 32 urban local authorities, of the budgeted US$10 million, 
ZINARA disbursed about 23 per cent between January and June 2016.118 In 2015, urban 
local authorities received 57 per cent of the budgeted US$10 million.119 Considering that 
urban local authorities are responsible for 8,190 kilometres of the road network, the 
Government of Zimbabwe is choking road maintenance by urban local authorities. 
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Despite this, ZINARA disburses funds to road authorities without making reference to 
budget allocations. The results of such arbitrary allocations has seen other road authorities 
‘receiving amounts 1,503 per cent over and above their allocation while others receive 
nothing’.120 Table 2 shows significant variations between allocations and disbursements by 
ZINARA. 
 
The association of local authorities told the local government ministry that ‘the impact [of 
vehicle licensing takeover] will be highly negative in that roads will not be maintained and 
more legal suits will arise and council will lose significant amounts of funds compensating 
the complainants’.121 In addition, the Zimbabwe Local Government Association (ZILGA) 
noted that the public outcry about poor roads showed that residents were losing confidence 
in their local authorities.122 The  relationship  between  central  government  and  local 
authorities  has  been  problematic  in  the  21st  century.  Primarily, this is explained by 
differences in visions and positions over the autonomy of local authorities. Central 
government often intervenes and distorts the operations of local authorities through 




Motorists in major cities like Harare and Bulawayo cumulatively pay more license fees, but, 
when vehicle licensing funds are allocated, equity issues are considered rather than traffic 
volume. The fund allocation criteria are questionable and politically motivated; the largest 
contributing cities are suffocated. Therefore it can be argued that ZINARA is an irrational 
model for urban road infrastructure maintenance. 
 
State of Road Infrastructure in Cities 
Zimbabwe has 8,190 kilometres of urban roads managed by urban local authorities.123 
Rapid urbanisation and high urban poverty are straining municipal revenue streams, 
making expansion and maintenance of urban infrastructure difficult.124 This situation is 
exacerbated by road construction standards that have been severely compromised. This 
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can be attributed to either absence of quality control or corruption in council construction 
works. Substandard construction products and temporary maintenance provided by most 
local authorities also explain the derelict road infrastructure.125 On the other hand, private 
property developers have been cheating homeowners by using substandard construction 
materials.126 
 
Most local authorities are weak, characterised by corrupt tendering and procurement 
procedures. Tendering is opaque, ‘with no plans and time for councillors to devote to this 
process, as councillors are preoccupied with taking decisions’.127 Lack of transparency in 
tendering and procurement compromise key council decisions and the resultant service 
offered. Corruption affects road infrastructure tenders. In most tenders, ‘as long as 
councillors were involved, there is evidence of corruption’.128 
 
The Auditor General’s 2012 Report on local authorities pointed to corruption and funds 
mismanagement in local authorities in general and in particular procurement of goods and 
services. The report notes that: 
 
Mutare City Council awarded a tender to Westgate Investments of US$662,466 in respect 
of the supply of water pipes and fittings. This obligation was not honoured although 
Council made  50  per  cent  payment … .  The  Buhera  Rural  District  Council  management  
incurred unauthorised excess expenditure amounting to US$130,752. Full Council Meeting 
Number 16 passed resolution C244 (b) which authorised the construction of a sewer line 
and ponds in by  a  private  construction  company  at  a  cost  of  US$298,568.  By  year  
end, by  a  private  construction  company  at  a  cost  of  US$298,568.  By  year  end, 
 
Council management had spent US$429,320, which was 44 per cent way [sic] above the 
authorised limit of US$298,568. Chipinge Rural District Council acquired three (3) 
vehicles from South Africa. There was no evidence to suggest that these acquisitions were 
done following proper procurement procedures.129 
 
Although local authorities invite tenders, the selection criteria are not public 
knowledge. Tendering is thus a contested issue, because most companies that ‘were 
awarded the tenders … belong to council officials or politicians’.130 During field research, 
the authors were denied a roster of all tenders awarded over the past decade in major 
cities. Tendering was also influenced by the local government ministry, with tenders 
awarded to ZANU(PF) sympathisers. For instance, Umguza, Ruwa, and Harare councils 
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were ‘forced to pay in advance by the local government ministry for tender services not 
yet provided’.131 
 
Of all the major cities in Zimbabwe, there is no evidence of infrastructure rehabilitation 
and development plans in excess of a 10-year planning period. This means that proactive 
development planning is largely, if not completely, missing in Zimbabwe. More specifically, it 
shows that infrastructure development and rehabilitation is not a top priority for local 
authorities. In addition, issues of poor planning, wrong priorities and bloated staff affect the 
capacity of urban local authorities to maintain infrastructure.132 Challenges to maintenance 
can also be attributed to central government, which no longer provides public sector 
investment programme grants that can support road maintenance. The formula for sharing 
vehicle licensing fees among local authorities by ZINARA seems dysfunctional and opaque. 
It would seem that the operation of ZINARA resembles ‘ratepayers subsidising the state 
rather than the reverse’.133 
 
Before 2000, road infrastructure was built before houses. After 2000, however, people 
were allowed to build houses without the infrastructure.134 The situation is haphazard, as 
local authorities lack the political will and technical and financial capacity to construct road 
infrastructure before houses. As such, the infrastructure is dilapidated, ‘due to a combination 
of the politicisation of road infrastructure construction and maintenance, and economic 
instability’.135 
 
The net effect of ZINARA on road infrastructure maintenance is a ‘serious and negative one, 
the same effect with ZINWA (on water and sanitation) and ZESA (on electricity)’.136 
Centralisation of various services, which occurred gradually in the post-independence era, 
destroyed service delivery institutional arrangements. Mutare, Harare, and Gweru generated 
and supplied their own electricity until January 1986, when ZESA was created out of an 
amalgamation of the mentioned three local authorities’ electricity departments and two other 
companies.137 However, the subsequent energy crisis born of such centralisation continues 
unabated. ZINARA (roads), ZINWA (water and sanitation), ZESA (electricity) and Zimbabwe 
United Passenger Company (for rural and urban transport) allow central government – and, by 
extension, ZANU(PF) – to direct service delivery operations through parastatals.138 However, 
many of these parastatals are fraught with corporate governance malpractices.139 
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Centralisation in Zimbabwe goes back to the model of the one-party state, where 
government tries to do everything for the people yet in practice delivers virtually nothing.140 
The government of Zimbabwe has a long history of  ‘taking over functions from local 
authorities with access to funds as the main reason’.141 Such levels of centralisation, we 
argue,  indicate  ZANU(PF)’s   ideological  underpinnings:  the   government  believes  in 
centralisation as a way to organise the state. 
 
Conclusion 
Both before and after 2000, the Government of Zimbabwe has been determined to strip local 
authorities of key functions. In this regard, existing scholarship attributes post-2000 
centralisation to urban political struggles between the MDC and ZANU(PF).142 Drawing on 
the centralisation of water and sanitation and vehicle licensing, this article has argued that 
there are other compelling reasons that explain post-2000 centralisation. First, we argued 
that the pre- and post-2000 antecedents of centralisation indicate the ZANU(PF)’s firm 
belief in centralisation as a strategy for organising the state. Between 1980 and 2000, local 
authority functions such as health, education and electricity were taken over by government 
entities. Thus understanding post-2000 centralisation requires understanding relations 
between central and local government before 2000. In other words, the post-2000 
centralisation is a manifestation of the ZANU(PF) government’s fetish for it. 
 
Second, the collapse of the economy in the post-2000 era affected government revenue. As 
a result, it became imperative to manage directly urban cash-cow services, such as water and 
vehicle licensing. Such arrangements allow government occasionally to take such revenues 
and fund its programmes. At the same time, withdrawing functions that provide vital 
revenue to cities essentially weakens the administration of such cities. 
 
Third, the ZANU(PF) government uses centralisation to maintain a firm grip on power. In 
spite of it being clear that the ZANU(PF) lost the electoral contest in urban centres to the 
opposition,  the  struggle  shifted  to  a  ‘functions  battle’.  While  a  political  party can win 
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elections to run cities, it is the ability to perform functions that demonstrates power. Thus 
centralising functions became a show of power and made the ZANU(PF) relevant in urban 
life, though it had lost elections. 
 
Fourth, the divide between rural and urban areas in terms of political allegiances also 
explains centralisation of, in particular, vehicle licensing functions. The socio-economic and 
political challenges facing the country grounded key rural development institutions such as 
the District Development Fund (DDF). The DDF is mandated with, among other things, 
road maintenance in rural areas. After 2000, however, the DDF’s financial and technical 
capacity was whittled away. In a balancing act, government took over vehicle licensing 
functions to distribute urban generated resources to rural areas. 
 
The evidence presented in this article indicates that centralisation has adversely affected the 
delivery of services in Zimbabwe. The country’s problems of service delivery – energy, water 
and sanitation, health, education, road infrastructure – are, in part, a result of the 
centralisation carried out by the government. In this regard, problems of service delivery 
within cities are largely a creation of the central government. In the post-independence era, 
evidence suggests that central government has opted to centralise local authority functions in 
return for political control, resources and maintaining power. 
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